Does any one psychological process give rise to visual awareness? One candidate is selective attention-when we attend to something it seems we always see it. But if attention can selectively enhance our response to an unseen stimulus then attention cannot be a sufficient precondition for awareness. ] demonstrated just such a dissociation in the blindsight subject GY. Here, we test whether the dissociation generalizes to the normal population. We presented observers with pairs of coloured discs, each masked by the subsequent presentation of a coloured annulus. The discs acted as primes, speeding discrimination of the colour of the annulus when they matched in colour and slowing it when they differed. We show that the location of attention modulated the size of this priming effect. However, the primes were rendered invisible by metacontrast-masking and remained unseen despite being attended. Visual attention could therefore facilitate processing of an invisible target and cannot, therefore, be a sufficient precondition for visual awareness.
General introduction
What makes us aware of the world we see? Introspection suggests that when we selectively attend to part of the visual scene we become aware of objects in that region. This was noted by early empirical Psychologists (James, 1890; Wundt, 1912) who proposed a causal link between visual attention and awareness which remains part of many contemporary theories of visual awareness (e.g. Baars ' (1988) global workspace theory). The ability to select part of the visual world for enhanced processing makes adaptive sense. But need it be the case that all stimuli which benefit from this selective processing advantage necessarily reach awareness? Are visual attention and visual awareness really aspects of a single process or are there circumstances where one acts without giving rise to the other? * Corresponding author. Lamme (2003) has argued that phenomenal awareness might be independent of attention. Many stimuli might elicit phenomenal experience (akin to iconic memory), only those to which we attend engage access consciousness -are capable of engaging working memory. Attention may not, therefore, be necessary for awareness per se. Recent evidence suggests that allocation of visual attention to a stimulus may not always be sufficient to render that stimulus consciously visible to the observer. In such circumstances the role of attention may be evident by virtue of a selective advantage in behavioural responses to attended stimuli despite the fact that those stimuli are not acknowledged.
Two of us, working in collaboration with Larry Weiskrantz (Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 1999 , 2004 ) discovered the first evidence for just such an effect in a patient, GY, who has the neurological condition of 'blindsight' (Weiskrantz, 1986) . Patients with 'blindsight' demonstrate preserved visual abilities in the absence of acknowledged awareness. They can, for example, guess whether a visual stimulus is presented in the first or second of two temporal intervals with remarkable accuracy
